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WH E N the final scenes of Shakespeare's tragedies are properly understood, they invariably leave the aud-ience with a sense of uneasiness about the adequacy of 
the plays' final actions and statements. When this uneasiness 
arises, as it must, it stems not from suspicions about the ade-
quacy of the dramatist's design but from our discerning a not-
able gap in judgement between our own response to the shape of 
events and the response articulated by the society within the 
play, and from our need to assess the function of this disparity. 
We feel sure that our understanding of the significance of the 
tragic action is broader and deeper, more comprehensive 
altogether, than that arrived at by those who have participated 
in a spectacle of suffering that we have merely witnessed as an 
aesthetic construct. Detecting a certain incompleteness, even a 
certain hollowness, in what might appear to be the play's con-
clusive statements about itself, we ought to reflect that the 
society upon the stage is, in its own terms, not upon the stage 
but in life and that that society, responding as it does to terrible 
events in life, is only capable of surveying them in the mirror of 
the very recent past and, at best, of discovering thereby moral 
and prudential guidelines for the future. It should follow that 
that society is, properly, so aware of these events as life and not 
at all as art, that a coincidence of its judgement with the judge-
ment of the society in the theatre (which has witnessed not life 
but history as tragedy) would be both illogical and indecorous. 
Such a reflection may, to some extent, qualify our sense of 
uneasiness, but it does not by any means eliminate it. What 
does eliminate it is the recognition that the concluding scenes 
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do more than establish a dichotomy between our final judge-
ment and that of the play's ultimate spokesmen: these scenes 
may be said to insist that the society of the play cannot arrive at 
anything like our understanding of the tragic action and, what 
is more important, should not. 
The question to be asked is this: why does Shakespeare in the 
last scenes of his tragedies put before us characters who, 
addressing and representing their contemporaries, fail to see 
what in the action and in the protagonist transcends the limita-
tions of mere history and, necessarily, undermines the adequa-
cy of any moral that can be drawn from the whole? The answer 
may be that his establishing for the society of the play a norm of 
insufficient insight and inadequate utterance is an irony de-
signed to emphasize the need for the audience to complete the 
work of art by recognizing what is most typically human and 
most typically timeless in its suggestive spectacle. Such an 
answer may help us to assess how Shakespeare's tragedies 
achieve catharsis and to define the kind of catharsis they 
achieve. The failure of the society of the play to gain the insight 
which we as audience possess (ideally, at least) emphasizes the 
universality of the tragic potential which realized itself as fact 
in this very society. They acknowledge the completion of what 
we might call a tragic fact, and they are satisfied that it is 
complete. In their satisfaction with the completeness of the fact 
they cannot see that the potential is in no way diminished by its 
having been realised in a particular case. Indeed, their very 
concentration on the special case of the protagonist as that of an 
individual whom they have known, whom they have deemed 
unique, and whom they have seen die blinds them to the reality 
of what they shared and still share with him. This blindness lies 
in their failure to understand what in him and in them led to the 
disaster they have witnessed and shared in. In a sense they have 
learned nothing: at least, they have not learned enough; hence 
they are scarcely better prepared to prevent a recurrence of the 
tragic than they were at the outset. We have failed to under-
stand the tragedy fully if we do not recognize that this is as it 
should be. 
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Already, a few concessions may be in order. First of all, it is 
undoubtedly misleading to speak, as I have done, of the need for 
the audience to complete the work of art by acts of recognition or 
reflection. This suggests active participation, where in reality 
audiences are passive — acted upon, not acting. The effect of a 
tragedy upon an audience is a function of the form of the 
tragedy. The play is complete in itself, containing and revealing 
all that has to be explained and understood, presenting itself to 
us in its wholeness, achieving its clarification1 by answering all 
the demands of its own necessities and probabilities; for us, in so 
far as we can be purely audience, it is all we know and all we 
need to know. But this brings us to a second concession: to 
speak, as I have done, of the insight which we as audience 
possess is to take far too much for granted. As audience, we are 
required to do no more than witness what acts upon us; but we 
are required to bring to this witnessing what might be called an 
intelligent passivity. We must bring to the play the kind of 
discrimination that responds to its wholeness, recognizing what 
is implicit as well as explicit in any unit of action that unfolds 
before us — and it matters not whether this unfolding takes 
place on the stage or on the page. To respond to a unit of action in 
terms of its immediate and obvious suggestiveness, without 
responding to its significance as an aspect of the structure of the 
whole is, potentially at least, to miss revealing ironies. This is 
an especial problem for an audience as it witnesses the cata-
strophe of a Shakespearian tragedy, where, normally, final 
spokesmen make or, in some cases, promise statements which 
are adequate only as partial reactions to the complexities of the 
dreadful experience now at its culmination, but statements 
which, because they are so final and because they are not gain-
said, may win from us, if we are not ironically alert, both assent 
and approval. Thereby, they provoke in us a tendency to dis-
regard the fulness of our experience as audience and to deny the 
insight provided by the only adequate statement that is uttered 
to us, the statement that is the whole dramatic poem. To find 
these statements totally convincing is, of course, to be free of 
that essential uneasiness which I discussed at the outset. It is 
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also to miss the full meaning of the play. It is to evade catharsis, 
because it is to be content with the understanding or clarifica-
tion arrived at by characters who have not witnessed and can 
never know the whole of what we have witnessed and should 
know. 
In a very real sense, any Shakespearian tragedy may be said 
to represent a closed system. In so far as it is an action dramatiz-
ing the crucial events in the life and death of the protagonist 
and the way in which these events affect those who surround 
him, it achieves the conclusive revelation of its internal coher-
ence in the catastrophe, which is the appropriate and necessary 
conclusion of all that has preceded it.2 All that has to be revealed 
is revealed; of the action, understood in terms of what happened, 
nothing more need be said. The question, what happened to 
Othello, or Hamlet, or Lear, and why? has its complete answer. 
So whole and so final a revelation of event and of cause and 
effect puts the audience in total possession of the facts and, 
hence, in a position that Sidney's historian could scarcely dare 
hope for in this brazen world.3 Yet we are left with the limita-
tions of Sidney's historian's particular account of things if we go 
no further than the coming to terms with event as event, that is, 
if we fail to rise above the discovery of the fulness of sequence to 
a perception of the universal significance of what is revealed in 
that sequence. The achievement of this "golden" perception 
depends upon what might be called the refusal of tragedy to 
remain a closed system or, to put it another way, upon tragedy's 
insistence on opening out into life through strategies of incon-
clusi veness. The why and the wherefore of what happened to 
Othello and to those whose lives he touched still remains impor-
tant; but the arrival at the recognition of an answer to the 
question of how all of that constitutes a revelation of some 
essential truth of the human condition is of a higher order of 
importance. By achieving such a recognition we become, like 
the perfect reader of the compositions of Sidney's peerless poet, 
capable of perceiving universal truths — though what tragedy 
reveals may not teach the kind of thing that Sidney had in mind. 
But how, it might be asked, do we achieve the recognition in 
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question? I suggest that we achieve it if, whether rationally or 
intuitively, tragic character represents an exploration of some 
timeless aspects of what is human, that tragic plot represents a 
mere account of events in time involving the fortunes of particu-
lar humans — that plot partakes of the timely and so of the 
finite, character of the timeless and, in this sense, of the infinite. 
Out of the dynamic tensions between plot and charcter, between 
conclusive and inconclusive systems of coherence, comes the 
possibility of tragic insight. 
The tensions between strategies of conclusiveness and incon-
clusiveness, between the finality of closed plot and the open-
ended potential for a recurrence of the tragic as revealed 
through character are particularly impressive in Macbeth* and 
particularly subtle too. Indeed they are so subtle that it is 
hardly surprising that one might succumb to the tendency not 
to detect or, more commonly, not to recognize with the necessary 
clarity the illuminating ironies provided in the catastrophe. 
The possibility of myopic error in our response is greater here 
than in the rest of Shakespeare's mature tragedies, Bradley's 
big four, because in Macbeth the evil emanating from the villain 
hero urgently demands his destruction, because the hero's 
deliberate choice of that evil and his determined adherence to 
its consequences urgently demand retribution — that poetic 
justice which is the more or less adequate reflection of ideal 
justice here upon the bank and shoal of time5 — and because the 
dramatic satisfying of these demands is accompanied by an 
insistent and desirable celebration of renewal. 
The play's thrust towards resolution comprises two major 
counterpointed movements, the one dramatizing the terrible 
and proper discomfiture of the tyrant hero, the other dramatiz-
ing the reassuring and prosperous march towards victory of the 
forces of righteousness. The first of these movements may be 
said to be negative, the second positive; both are very explicit, so 
explicit, in fact, as to be unproblematical and, hence, in need of 
no discussion here. Yet something of the obvious will be dis-
cussed so as to illustrate the importance of a third movement, as 
much implicit as explicit, which develops within the second and 
which, by undercutting it, by ironically qualifying its positive-
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ness, constitutes the universalizing principle. This principle is 
unheeded by Malcolm and his triumphant friends as they re-
spond to the meaning of Macbeth-the-villain-king and learn 
from the history they have shared with him the moral lessons 
and the practical wisdom that are to shape the life of restored 
Scotland. 
One of the principal reasons why the audience of Macbeth is 
prone to myopic perception in the end is that the positive move-
ment of the falling action, that of effective restoration and 
triumphant justice, is so apt and seems so comprehensive.6 The 
promise of a solution to the Macbeth problem is a confident one. 
To perceive here (as we do in all the major tragedies) that the 
hero's problem is to some extent as much one of context as of 
character, arising as it does from a world of romance simplicity 
(in this case the Duncan world), is to expect that restoration, if it 
is to be that at all, must also be progression. Discovering signs of 
progress, we find satisfying the manner in which the forces of 
restoration overcome the limitations of assumption and ex-
pectation that characterized the naive and destroyed world that 
is both source of, and background to, the problem of the pro-
tagonist. 
The Duncan world reveals itself to us in its awesome simplic-
ity in the threatened society of I.ii., which as it experiences the 
release of victory seems incapable of understanding the reality 
of disloyalty and unaware of the nature of the linguistic confu-
sions that characterize the witches' chorus we have heard in Li . 
United in admiration for captains whose martial prowess is the 
epitome of loyalty, this society celebrates heroic irascibility as 
solely the expression of honour and worth; operates on the 
principle that the ideal of loyalty is the norm of the subject's 
behaviour, and responds to the perfidy of Macdonwald and 
Cawdor as an aberration from which there is nothing to learn. 
This society is similarly absolute in its expectation that utter-
ance bears a one-to-one relationship with truth and, just as its 
assumptions are validated with, respect to the virtue of its 
champions, they are also upheld by the reliability of its news-
bearers. The Duncan world is a world of absolutists, a world 
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notoriously unprepared for the threat of the relati vistic; a world 
which, though for the moment secure, is safe only if its foremost 
soldiers, its most able defenders, respond as Banquo does — but 
as Macbeth does not — to the encounter with relativism. It is 
safe if they reassert in will and deed the superiority of the ideals 
and truths essential to the order centred on Duncan when the 
rough beast of selfishness and dissimulation slouches towards 
its disordered Bethlehem to be born. 
The story of Macbeth is the story of the release of martial 
deeds from their sanctions of loyalty and just cause, a release 
paralleled and made possible by the wilful divorce of language 
from its associations with absolute values and transcendent 
reality and by an imprisoning of it within the univocal confines 
of egocentric relativism. Once loyalty can be interpreted solely 
as the deprivation of greatness, and greatness solely as the 
fulfilment of ambition; once murder is defined not as the moral-
ist's horrid deed but as the machiavellian's feat; once manliness 
is dissociated totally from the values of the humanist, then the 
accustomed act of life-taking is possible in an unaccustomed 
context and should assure desired success. The refusal of lan-
guage and values and reality to confine themselves to the 
dimensions of Macbeth's choosing is crucial to Macbeth's tragic 
experience, and crucial too is the perverse heroism of his 
perseverance to the commitment he makes. But that has to do 
with the private agony of the hero, the essential retribution of a 
world that is as moral and as complex as he knew from the 
beginning and more moral and more complex than is appro-
priate to his chosen necessities. Such retribution transcends the 
concerns of a society experiencing the chaos and terror that are 
the outward signs of its king's inner turmoil. The retribution 
possible for that society has to do with the phenomenal acci-
dents of Macbeth's failure, not with its metaphysical essentials; 
yet, for us who see all this as the development of a dramatic 
poem, the process of retribution must somehow address the 
essentials if it is to satisfy. 
If there is to be a restoration to life of an order antithetical to 
the Macbeth chaos, that order must involve (Da reaffirmation 
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of the values and a strengthening of the wisdom that Macbeth 
has eschewed, (2) a reintegration of soldiership with ethical 
principle and (3) a restoration of language to the complexity 
that allows words to echo the wholeness of the reality to which 
man relates. The function of IV.iii, the scene at the English 
court, is to lay the foundation for this threefold restoration. It 
does so by establishing Malcolm as successor and contrary to 
Macbeth and also as heir and contrary to Duncan, as one with 
an awareness of the Duncan vision and a knowledge of the 
Macbeth fact. It does so too by focusing on Macduff as the 
principle and person that persuasively counters Macbeth's dis-
sociation of virtus heroica from moral virtue and gives the nay to 
Macbeth's restriction of language to those meanings only that 
reflect the necessities of his will. Thereby it promises a con-
founding of those errors in government, both social and per-
sonal, that made possible the evil of Macbeth. 
The destructibility of the Duncan order and the tragic threat 
to the chief defender ofthat order, Macbeth, lay in the unpre-
paredness of the absolutist adequately to defend himself and his 
reality against the artifice that divorces mind's construction 
from facial expression and destroys the coherence of truth and 
verbal expression. The too-simple wisdom of the Duncan world, 
which lay in the ethically approvable action of the imitator of 
ideals had no bulwarks against Macbeth's relativistic perver-
sion of the doctrine that defines "all that may become a man" 
(I.vii.46). The assertion that is IV.iii assures us that the night of 
what follows from that perversion will unfailingly find its day. 
The scene provides a dramatic analogue of Donne's suggestion 
in "The First Anniversary" that memory of the old and better 
world remains as a "glimmering light" that "creates a new 
world" which, whatever the threats to its sufficiency, "may be 
safer, being told/The dangers and diseases of the old."7 IV.iii 
presents us with a Malcolm whose practical knowledge of what 
is coupled with the ethical idealism of what was or what might 
be constitutes prudence, a prudence which, realized in ethical 
behaviour, will be the wisdom that informs the restoration of 
Scottish life. 
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Malcolm's prudence and the manner in which it supersedes 
and, still, complements the absolutism of his father's day are 
immediately focused upon in the beginning of the scene. Con-
fronted with the appealing sincerity of Macduff, Ducan's son 
shows his awareness of how to detect the mind's construction 
whatever face or word affect, declaring immediately his scep-
ticism (which he variously labels his "doubts" [1.25] and 
"jealousies" [1.29]), in words which define his freedom from the 
absolutist's norm of simple faith: 
What I believe, I'll wail, 
What know, believe; and what I can redress, 
As I shall find the time to friend, I will. 
(IV.iii. 8-10) 
This scepticism in no way denies the validity of the absolutist's 
truth, but it affirms the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of 
attaining to truth. Therefore Malcolm's philosophic position 
resembles that of the relativist. Yet he acknowledges that Mac-
duffs words may, "perchance," perfectly embody truth (1. 11). 
Therefore, his "modest wisdom" (1.119) is free of the destructive 
expediency of realists of the Lady Macbeth sort and, equally, of 
the defenceless credulity (1.120) of idealists such as Duncan. He 
is prepared for treachery's wearing the vizard of honesty, but, 
on the other hand, he confesses that his bias of thought cannot 
"transpose" the reality of Macduff s disposition (1.21): therefore 
his relativism is not pessimistic cynicism: fair is still fair, 
however successfully "foul" may play its deceptive role (11. 
23-24). His assertion, "Angels are bright still, though the 
brightest fell" (1. 22) reminds us not only of Satan, but of 
Macbeth; for this reason, we can interpret Malcolm's apology for 
his cautiousness — 
Let not my jealousies be your dishonours, 
But mine own safeties. You may be rightly just 
Whatever I shall think — 
(IV.iii. 29-31, emphasis added) 
as a form of relativistic freedom which contrasts with and, as it 
were, counteracts the limited relativism of Macbeth, whose 
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reliance on the prophecies of the witch-conjured apparitions of 
IV.i is typical of his insistence that reality conform unam-
biguously to his own mode of thought. 
Malcolm shows that his wisdom is not only knowledge of what 
should be and what is in the fallen world but also ethical 
commitment to active virtue in its private and public aspects.8 
This is evident when he probes Macduff s intention. First he 
imputes to himself the absence of active virtue, 
Yet my poor country 
Shall have more vices than it had before, 
More suffer, and more sundry ways than ever, 
By him that shall succeed. 
(IV.iii.46-9) 
Then, when Macduff declares the unfitness for monarchy and 
even for life (11. 102-103) of one so vicious, Malcolm unspeaks 
his own "detraction" and abjures the "taints and blames" he has 
laid upon himself (11. 123-24). This self-denigration is an ironic 
revelation of his knowledge of the "king-becoming graces" (1. 
91) and of his judgement upon the graceless kingship of Mac-
beth. But knowledge alone is not wisdom, and Malcolm, when 
he switches from the craft of ironic utterance to the guileless-
ness of direct statement, commits himself to a programme of 
action that accords with the ethical integrity (1.116) of the good 
man's will; he restates his earlier declaration of readiness to 
redress known evil (11. 8-10): "What I am truly/Is thine, and my 
poor country's to command" (11. 131-32). 
The definition of wisdom as active virtue is but one basic 
principle established in this scene as antithesis to Macbeth's 
departure from that wisdom in the decision to perform his 
"terrible feat" (I.vii.80). If the promise of complete restoration is 
to be fully dramatized as solution to the Macbeth problem, 
Malcolm must, as I have said, show a commitment to the res-
toration of language to its moral function and of soldierliness to 
virtuous wholeness. 
Malcolm's discussion of the "king-becoming graces" may be 
as disconcerting for us as it is for the despairing Macduff, but it 
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manifests a camouflage calculated to elicit, not to distort, truth. 
It is similar in kind to the tactic of translating the branches of 
Birnam later on, a tactic which demonstrates how guile, har-
nessed to the will to restore an order of honesty, is necessary if 
the integrity of guileless men is once again to thrive. 
It is Macduff who represents the guileless man. His role is 
primarily that of truth-teller, here as elsewhere in the play. It is 
as the voice of truth that he approaches circumspect Malcolm: 
his account of the state of Scotland in the opening lines — 
Each new morn 
New widows howl, new orphans cry, new sorrows 
Strike heaven on the face, that it resounds 
As if it felt with Scotland, and yell'd out 
Like syllable of dolor — 
(IV.iii.5-8) 
has a status as truth that is only too sadly supported by our 
having seen the murder of his family just moments before. 
Later, when Rosse proves a too-discreet bearer of the news of 
this dire event, Macduff s demand, "Be not niggard of your 
speech; how goes't?" (1. 180) shows an intolerance of veiled 
truths, however terrible their nakedness may be. He wins Rosse 
to the language of uncompromising honesty, getting him to 
speak of Macbeth's achievements in "words/That should be 
howl'd out in the desert air" (11. 193-95), just as, earlier in the 
scene, he had won the prudently suspicious Malcolm to reflect in 
unambiguous language the truth of Siward's setting forth, 
"with ten thousand warlike men" (1. 134), to try the "chance of 
goodness" (1. 136) in a kingdom where each flower deceptively 
masks a serpent. Macduff, the unveiler of truth, Macduff who 
proclaimed the death of Duncan not as terrible "feat" but as 
ineffable "horror," as "sacrilegious murder," as confusion's 
"masterpiece" (IILiii.64-69) is here affirmed as the proper agent 
to dispel Macbeth's linguistic confusion; as the honest voice that 
will unmask the "double sense" in the word "born" (V.viii.13-
20) and win from the suppressor of unwanted truths the unin-
tended compliment, 
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Accursed be that tongue that tells me so, 
For it hath cow'd my better part of man! 
(V.viii.17-18) 
The third major function if IV.iii is to establish the redemp-
tion of martial worth from the state to which it had fallen when 
Macbeth committed himself to the soldiership appropriate to 
the "legions/Of horrid hell" (IV.iii.55-56). This it does by show-
ing Malcolm restoring valour and honour to the status of virtue 
they enjoyed when Banquo chose fidelity to his own integrity 
rather than the honours attendant on his cleaving to Macbeth's 
will (II.i.25-29). Malcolm's aptness for the task is shown in his 
promise to cleave to the will of honest Macduff, "child of integ-
rity" (IV.iii.115) and in his attempt to convert his followers' 
knowledge of rampant crime into the moral action of nature's 
justicers. 
As energizer of the forces of retribution, Malcolm teaches 
bereaved Macduff to express his silent grief in the rhetoric of 
martial action: "Dispute it like a man.. . . Be this the whetstone 
to your sword" (IV.iii.220, 228). Macduff responds positively, 
recognizing that the enraged heart is in harmony with heaven's 
will, and that the language of the sword is the appropriate 
expression of righteous indignation: the revenge which is, in 
Malcolm's language, a "medicine" (IV.iii.214) is to be in its 
context analogous to the healing touch of the saintly Edward, 
whose hand Heaven sanctifies (1. 144); it is, furthermore, 
blessed by the same Edward, who furnishes an army to aid the 
cause of a future king whom Birnam-bound Caithness will call 
"the med'cine of the sickly weal" (V.ii.27). 
In the light of all of this, it would seem and, I suggest, it is, 
proper to see Malcolm's cause and his success (and also his final 
promises to plant new honours and "by the grace of Grace" to 
perform "in measure, time and place" (V.ix.38-39) all that is 
appropriate to the responsibilities of a good king) — it is proper, 
I say, to see all this in terms of the idea of the Heavenly powers 
putting on their instruments to overcome one who has become 
an instrument of darkness and who, thereby, in deepest con-
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sequence betrayed himself to the very heart of loss. 
But our response to so positive an ending should not frustrate 
our Donatan awareness that, for more than the dead hero, 
tragedies end badly, and that here, as elsewhere, Shakespeare 
is rather insistent on this point. Though the restorers of truth 
and wisdom, honour and loyalty have indeed solved the histor-
ical problem of Macbeth, they have not solved — they have not 
even recognized — the essential problem. Shakespeare miti-
gates our satisfaction with the triumph of light by making three 
ironic suggestions that the anagnorisis of the triumphant soci-
ety upon the state is very human in its limitations: the dramatic 
statement that Macbeth's tragic error is not his alone is found in 
the handling 1 ) of the report of Young Siward's death, 2) of 
Macduff s appearing with Macbeth's decollated head, and 3) of 
Malcolm's definitive posthumous description of the tyrants of 
Dunsinane. 
For old Siward as he accepts news of his son's destruction, as 
for Malcolm when he guided Macduff s moral soldiership in the 
scene at the English court and for Macduff both when he con-
fronts and kills the tyrant and when he appears before us with 
his gory trophy to announce that at last "The time is free" 
(V.ix.21), the assumptions that make the soldier's irascibility 
virtue are buttressed morally by certainty of the justice of their 
cause. Virtue is unequivocally virtue; but is this so only because 
the context is right? Perhaps, because there is surely something 
questionable about the awareness of those involved. Analyzed 
without reference to its well-established moral context, Mal-
colm's encouragement to Macduff in IV.iii, "Dispute it like a 
man" and "This tune goes manly" (11. 220, 235), can be seen to 
be dangerously similar in tenor to Lady Macbeth's advocacy (in 
l.vii) of destructive manliness. Shakespeare is careful to de-
emphasize Malcolm's own Hamletian role as avenger of a mur-
dered king-father in order to make him primarily the wise guide 
of Macduff s moral and martial energies and the symbol of 
moral authority; still, he insures that some of this wise guide's 
expressions, such as "let grief/Convert to anger; blunt not the 
heart, enrage it" (1. 229), may be disturbing in their unrecog-
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nized implications. We know that Malcolm is rightly encourag-
ing Macduff to convert his sorrow to righteous indignation, that 
he is advocating a virtuous combination of passion (anger) with 
right reason; but we must surely note, nonetheless, or discover 
in retrospect, that the words in themselves are not distant from 
"for mine own good/All causes shall give way" (III.iv. 134-35). 
What justifies Malcolm is his conviction that he and Macduff 
and the other soldiers must use martial wrath to fulfil their 
function as instruments of the Powers above. In this immediate 
situation, soldierly irascibility and its spontaneous deeds are 
good because they are allied to goodness. But, while we can 
approve the conscious intention of Malcolm, we can also recog-
nize how an attitude such as his has within it the potential for a 
confusion of absolute with relative good: in other circum-
stances, potentially at least, personal vindictiveness may usurp 
the place ofthat revenge which is justice. Macbeth has involved 
himself in such confusion; and his egoism led him oft to speak of 
various medicines needed to purge his Scotland of the evil which 
contradicts his good. Hence, there is a buried irony in "Let's 
make med'cines of our great revenge/To cure this deadly grief 
(Macduff s personal loss) (11. 214-15), which should alert us to 
the universality of Macbeth's tragic potential. 
The Macduff who stands before us with the severed head is 
also a questionable image: he is now what Macbeth was in I.ii, 
"virtue with valour armed", but he is also Bellona's bridegroom; 
he is the performer of an unparalleled manly feat, having as 
effectively curbed the spirit of his adversary as Macbeth did 
that of a Thane of Cawdor whose title and whose role he so 
worthily inherited. And the society that, rejoicing, proclaims 
the freedom of the time with a choric "Hail, King of Scotland" 
(V.ix.25) is no more critical of prowess per se — of its centrifugal 
possibilities — than it was in its earlier stage of awareness in 
I.ii. To point out that the unquestioned certainties ofthat early 
scene of victory were soon to be followed by the witches' "All 
Hail" (I.iii.69) litany may seem too ingenious — and probably is. 
Yet, there are curious silences in the play, and these have their 
own suggestive ironies. Many among Shakespeare's original 
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audience would not have learned from Holinshed that the reign 
of Malcolm Canmore was rather long than happy, nor known 
the time, cause and agent of his violent death.9 They too, like us, 
may have wondered how and when and why Banquo's issue 
would achieve the golden round. Donalbain and Fleance are in 
the wings of the future; how they will enter the stage of history 
is not important really; how they might do so is important — 
because the Macduff whose vengeance is justice is a Macduff 
whose vengeance might well have been autonomous, and the 
vindication of his will is a precedent whose single state of virtue 
deserves scrutiny. 
The news of Young Siward's death reveals too society's in-
clination to assume an equation of virtue and virtus heroica. 
Siward, who we were told is the best of soldiers in Christendom 
(IV.iii.191-92), learns that his son has "paid a soldier's debt" 
and (V.ix.5) that the boy-become-man died "like a man" (1.9). In 
this, unlike us, who know that there are other views of man 
than Pico della Mirandola's, he finds total reassurance: 
Siward. Had he his hurts before? 
Rosse. Ay, on the front. 
Siward. Why then, God's soldier be he! 
Had I as many sons as I have hairs, 
I would not wish them to a fairer death. 
(V.viii.12-15) 
Old Siward is right: his son died as brave man and as God's 
soldier. We have witnessed that. But the logic of the old soldier's 
conclusion has recognizably within it the potential for unwar-
ranted identification of the manly and the godly, of brave with 
good. In this questionable logic, heroic will demonstrates its 
fascinating self-sufficiency and self-regarding simplicity. That 
the conqueror of the boy may have been brave, but not good, 
does not enter into the reckoning. So, it is only the "grace of 
Grace" (V.ix.38) that Siward's "why then" leads to a true conclu-
sion, just as it is only by the harmony of Macduff s cause with 
Providence that the beheading of Macbeth is not "horror". Sol-
dierly virtue secure in its own Tightness is moral virtue when it 
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is an exercise of justice — that is, when courage and conscience 
give wholeness to manliness. It is only while that equilibrium is 
maintained that the time is truly free. Men like Siward and 
Macduff are evidence that the Macbeth error is an universal 
potential. The only certainty we are left with is that if, and 
when, men like these "yield to . . . suggestion" (I.iii.134) they 
are not likely to see so clearly and feelingly what Macbeth has 
seen and felt. 
What Macbeth has seen and felt brings us to the third of these 
ironies. The Malcolm who announces his intention to bring to 
justice the cruel ministers "Of this dead butcher and his fiend-
like queen" (V.ix.35) could learn from us to amend his speech a 
little. A certain Doctor of physic and a certain Waiting Gentle-
woman could, we know (V.i), tell that prayers to the spirits of 
murder can amazingly go unanswered. But who would listen! 
And what of "dead butcher"? How truly does this epitomize the 
life of one who lived the truth of his lie, "Had I but died an hour 
before this chance/I had liv'd a blessed time"? (II.iii.91-92) How 
truly does it synthesize the awful, inescapable experience of life 
as failure: the haunting mockery of "Sleep no more" (II.ii) and of 
Banquo's silent ghost (Ill.iv); the desperate futile will to escape 
from feeling thought (III.iv. 138-39); the ruthless honesty of the 
"Yellow leaf and the "Tomorrow" meditations on an existence 
that is nothing (V.iii and V.v.)? Where here is any shadow of the 
most painful reality of the agonized experience of guilt, the 
living hell of guilt-without-remorse? What can Malcolm say of 
the "dead butcher's" dreadfully human and terrifyingly nihilis-
tic anagnorisis? Nothing? Certainly he says far from enough. 
In this he differs, and must differ, from us. We, the society 
within the theatre (or study), have been granted that perfection 
which is the gift of omniscience. Our experience transcends the 
private story of Macbeth and the private illumination that is 
his, as well as the public story of Macbeth and the significance 
that affords to those affected — and in their way illuminated — 
by it. Ours is a godlike possession of the significance of the 
tragic poem. Ours is a claritas arrived at by curiously creaturely 
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means: affected by the pity and terror and the awe that are in 
and are aroused by the play, we witness and respond to its 
revealing wholeness, and, thus, are purged of the uncertainties 
that are the ironies of incompleteness. We see, in the distinct 
realities and in the shared realities of protagonist and survivor, 
the shape of the timely history that has ended and the essence of 
the timeless fallibility that cannot end and, thus, achieve the 
purification of understanding that tragic art provides. This, I 
think, is the catharsis that Shakespeare's tragedies effect and 
this, I think, is their mode of effecting it. 
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